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Inclusive fitness models in sociobiology emphasize the importance of relatedness, R, and 
synergy, S when exploring the evolution of social behaviours. Very few models explicitly 
consider ‘role’, or environmental stimuli, influencing the expression of behaviours, and 
none consider genetic-environment interactions where genotype predisposes individuals 
to certain roles. I propose a third key variable for inclusive fitness models, Q, which 
describes the overlooked potential bias in the genetic composition of individuals exposed 
to an environmental stimulus – here referred to as ‘role’. I describe a model built from 
Price’s formula which can be presented in a ‘Hamilton’s Rule’ format. I consider classic 
social behaviour models using this format, and find that the inclusion of gene-
environment interactions dramatically changes the results. This, in conjunction with the 
increasing evidence supporting gene-environment interactions in eusocial caste 
determination, suggests that current inclusive fitness models may be missing key details 
about the evolution of social behaviours. 
Keywords 
Inclusive fitness, kin selection, Price equation, social evolution, modelling, Hamilton’s 
Rule, conditional expression, conditional strategies, Hawk/Dove/Bourgeois game, 








Summary for Lay Audience 
To understand the evolution of social behaviours, evolutionary theorists must consider 
the direct fitness effects of a behaviour – how the behaviour influences the reproductive 
success of those enacting it, or ‘actors’ – and the indirect fitness effects of the behaviour 
– how the behaviour influences the reproductive success of individuals interacting with 
the actors. The combination of these two fitness components, called inclusive fitness, can 
be described in a simple mathematical form: RB – C > 0. When the relatedness, R, 
between the actor and recipient of the behaviour, is multiplied by the effect, B, that the 
actor’s behaviour has on the recipient, minus the effect of the actor’s behaviour on itself, 
C, is greater than zero, the behaviour is favoured by selection. This mathematical 
expression, commonly referred to as Hamilton’s Rule, helps to make clear how 
behaviours such as altruism can evolve. Hamilton’s Rule does not explicitly consider 
behaviours that are expressed conditionally depending on environmental factors however, 
nor does it consider the interaction of environmental factors and the genes involved in a 
behavior’s expression. For my thesis, I develop a mathematical model that expands upon 
Hamilton’s Rule to include conditionally expressed behaviours and the possibility for an 
interaction between the genotype of actors and the environmental stimuli to which they 
are exposed. Using my model, I explore a classic social behaviour example and find that 
when conditional expression and gene-environment interactions are considered, the 
outcome of this example change dramatically. Current sociobiological models that do not 
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Natural selection does not act solely on the individual. Discussed ad nauseum by 
evolutionary theorists for decades, the concept of indirect selection was touched upon 
even in Charles Darwin’s The Origin of Species (1859). While the majority of Darwin’s 
arguments supporting natural selection focus on examples of direct fitness effects – i.e., 
how an individual’s traits may affect its own reproductive success – he also touched upon 
the concept of selection acting on traits in one individual that affect the reproductive 
success of others, what are now known as indirect fitness effects. In his monumental 
book, Darwin discusses potential real-life examples of behaviours that may be difficult to 
explain with his theory of natural selection. One such example, which he referred to as 
“one special difficulty,” involved the evolution of sterile castes in eusocial insects.  
Eusocial insects such as ants, bees, wasps, and termites are differentiated into 
reproductive castes, such as queens and drones, and nonreproductive castes, such as 
workers. Nonreproductive castes in eusocial colonies – as the name suggests – do not 
produce their own offspring, and instead invest energy into helping reproducing relatives 
in ways that increase their (the relatives’) reproductive output. If natural selection only 
acted on traits that improve an individual’s direct fitness, sterile castes would be 
considered an anomaly that went against Darwin’s theory. Darwin understood this 
potential problem however, and resolved it to some degree by considering other ways in 
which selection may act, writing: 
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“This difficulty, though appearing insuperable, is lessened, or, as I believe, 
disappears, when it is remembered that selection may be applied to the family, as 
well as to the individual, and may thus gain the desired end.” 
In this way, ahead of his time, Darwin speculated upon the concept of indirect selection.  
1.1 Indirect selection theories 
Following The Origin of Species, the prevailing understanding of how traits detrimental 
to an organism’s direct fitness (for example, sterility in eusocial insects) might evolve 
became the topic of much investigation (Boomsma 2016). One highly controversial book 
exploring this topic, written by Wynne-Edwards (1962), strongly argued in support of 
group selection theory, which he defined as selection acting on traits which contribute to 
“the welfare and survival of the group… and when necessary subordinating the interests 
of the individual.” The history of literature on group selection is somewhat conflicting, 
with some works describing Wynne-Edwards as the first to coin the term (e.g., Williams 
1966, p. 96) despite its use much earlier in the literature (e.g., Fisher 1930), and others 
describing the concept as being widely accepted up until 1966 (e.g., Wilson 1983). It has 
been argued (Borello 2005) that Darwin also used group selection – though he did not use 
that terminology – as a solution for some of the difficulties he faced when applying 
natural selection to, for example, sterile worker castes in eusocial insects. The confusion 
here is likely due to the inconsistency in defining group selection, and a lack of historical 
reflection on the subject by some authors. David Sloan Wilson (1983), in discussing the 
mathematical approach to group selection, called the subject “polyphyletic,” as models of 
group selection seem to have stemmed from multiple authors (e.g., Wright 1945, Wynne-
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Edwards 1962, Maynard Smith 1964), with some neglecting to cite others’ previous 
works. 
In the meantime, other methods for exploring indirect selection were developing. Fisher 
(1930), for example, followed Darwin in considering the possibility of natural selection 
favoring traits detrimental to an individual if the individual’s relatives benefitted as a 
result. Haldane, often cited for his alleged comments about jumping into a river to save 
two brothers or eight cousins, also wrote of relatedness as a potential means for 
behaviours which are “socially valuable but individually disadvantageous” to evolve 
(1932, p. 207): 
“For a character of this type can only spread through the population if the genes 
determining it are borne by a group of related individuals whose chances of 
leaving offspring are increased by the presence of these genes in an individual 
member of the group whose own private viability they lower.” 
Sewall Wright, in his time, seems to have come the closest to developing an effective 
mathematical representation of indirect selection involving relatives, but failed to put the 
pieces together effectively. In 1922, Wright developed a coefficient of relationship, r, 
which he used to measure the level of relatedness between two focal individuals. Later, in 
a 1945 book review, Wright described a group selection model that illustrated how a 
“character of value to the population, but disadvantageous at any given moment to the 
individuals” may evolve, depending on a minimum benefit to the population caused by 
the trait, and a maximum disadvantage experienced by the individuals possessing the 
trait. He did not, however, include his coefficient of relatedness in this model. While it is 
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impossible to know why these researchers – known by some as being the founders of 
population genetics – were unable to develop an effective mathematical model of the 
problem they so clearly could describe verbally, Alan Grafen had some insight on the 
matter (Dugatkin 2007). It is possible that, because the economic-based approach to 
population genetics had not become popularized during the times of Fisher, Haldane and 
Wright, they did not have the foundational perspective required to make the appropriate 
connection in their work. The individual who did have this economic perspective was 
William Donald Hamilton.  
1.2 Inclusive fitness theory and Hamilton’s rule 
Hamilton was an undergraduate student at Cambridge University when he discovered 
Fisher’s The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection – a book which absorbed Hamilton to 
the point where his coursework suffered. Captivated by Fisher’s work, Hamilton was 
lucky enough to meet the professor himself, who happened to be teaching genetics at 
Cambridge University at that time. Despite getting along well with Fisher, Hamilton 
struggled to enjoy his undergraduate degree due to the lack of support for evolutionary 
theory from some of his professors (Grafen 2004). Possibly as a result of this, for his 
graduate degree Hamilton initially enrolled in an MSc in human demography at the 
London School of Economics. As his work shifted towards his interests in genetics and 
mathematics however, Hamilton transferred into a joint supervision at both the London 
School of Economics and University College London (Dugatkin 2007). During his 
graduate education, Hamilton remained interested in evolution and genetics and was 




“The rate of increase in fitness of any organism at any time is equal to its genetic 
variance in fitness at that time.” 
Hamilton sought to develop a mathematical model that was as generally applicable as 
Fisher’s theorem while remaining useful even for scenarios involving social behaviour, in 
which individuals behave in such a way that influences the fitness of others (of the same 
species). In his studies, Hamilton recognized the connection between relatedness and 
social behaviours referenced by previous researchers (see previous section for examples) 
(Hamilton 1964 II). Making use of Wright’s coefficient of relationship, Hamilton worked 
to create a model which considered the fitness effects of social behaviours and the 
relatedness between the social interactants involved. One difficulty he faced was the 
implication of Fisher’s fundamental theorem that the number of offspring an individual 
produced was dependent on its own genotype, not the genotype of other individuals 
(Grafen 2004).  
To fully understand the complication Hamilton faced, consider nonreproductive castes in 
eusocial insect colonies as an example. Nonreproductive workers in these colonies have 
evolved such that they themselves do not reproduce, but instead convey fitness benefits to 
reproducing queens. If we focus on the fitness benefits conveyed to the queen when 
modeling the evolution of the workers’ behaviour, we must take into consideration not 
only the queen’s genotype, but the genotype of the workers, because their behaviour is 
(presumably) caused by their genotype. In doing so, we imply that the number of 
offspring produced by the queen is dependent on both her genotype and that of the 
worker, but do not consider this interaction from the perspective of the workers. The 
question thus remains: why would workers give up their own fitness to help the queen? 
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To tackle this question, Hamilton developed the concept of inclusive fitness, which 
considered the fitness effects of an individual’s behaviour towards relatives as indirectly 
affecting its own fitness (Hamilton 1964 I). Thus in our eusocial insect example, we 
would consider the fitness benefit conveyed from a worker to a queen as indirectly 
affecting the worker’s own fitness. This concept can be formally written as an inequality, 
now commonly known as ‘Hamilton’s Rule’, which weighs the fitness effect that a focal 
individual (FI) has on another individual by the degree to which they are related, and 
compares this to the fitness effect that the FI has on itself. This can be written as 𝑅𝐵 > 𝐶, 
where R is approximate to Wright’s coefficient of relationship, RB is the indirect fitness 
effect experienced by the FI (calculated by multiplying R by the fitness effect the FI has 
on another individual, B), and C is the fitness effect that the FI causes to itself 
(alternatively written as RB – C > 0, depending on the signs of each coefficient).  When 
Hamilton’s Rule is fulfilled, the FI is said to be working to maximize its inclusive fitness 
– a measure of all direct and indirect fitness effects to the FI caused by its behaviour. See 
sections 2.1 and 2.2 for a full derivation of Hamilton’s Rule. 
In the years following his original 1964 publications, Hamilton worked to improve upon 
the minor weaknesses in his inclusive fitness formulas. With help from George R. Price, 
a population geneticist who has significantly contributed to selection mathematics, 
Hamilton re-derived his measure of relatedness R to encompass a wider variety of 
circumstances, such as inbred populations or spiteful behaviours (Grafen 2004). This new 
derivation of R has been the source of some confusion in previous literature (Gardner et 
al. 2011), as well as discussion of alternative measures of relatedness (Michod and 
Anderson 1979). For clarity, I will briefly review here both Wright’s (1922) coefficient 
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of relationship used as an estimator in Hamilton’s original (1964) models, and 
Hamilton’s re-derived ‘coefficient of relatedness’ described in his 1970 and 1972 works.  
Wright’s coefficient of relationship is calculated using inbreeding coefficients – a 
measure of the likelihood that an individual bears two copies of the focal allele as 
opposed to just one (i.e. it is autozygous for the focal allele) (Hamilton 1972). Using 
these inbreeding coefficients, Wright was able to trace back pedigrees to calculate the 
likelihood that two focal individuals share alleles at a given locus that are ‘identical by 
descent’ (IBD), or descended without mutation from the same ancestral allele in a 
common ancestor (Hill 1996; Michod and Anderson 1979). Wright’s relationship 
coefficient is therefore limited to positive values between 0 and 1. This seems reasonable; 
intuitively, we would not expect to find a “negative” relatedness value between 
individuals. For inbred populations, however, this type of measurement will be less 
useful, as two random individuals in the population may be more likely to share identical 
alleles at a given locus than two focal individuals. To avoid this problem, Hamilton re-
derived his inclusive fitness formula to include a coefficient of relatedness which 
incorporates Wright’s coefficient weighted against the likelihood that any two random 
individuals in the population will share genes IBD (Hamilton 1970). Many authors have 
since attempted to add to or modify this relatedness formula, with varying limitations or 
assumptions required for each. An overview of the various derivations of R was 
published in 1980 by Michod and Hamilton, who showed that these alternative formulas 
were effectively equivalent. The most effective and widely applicable form of R 
supported in Michod and Hamilton’s review paper was originally described by Orlove 
(1975) and Orlove and Wood (1978). The formula is described in Michod and Hamilton’s 
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(1980) publication as the covariance between a FI’s genotype at a given locus, z, and the 
genotype of its social partner, z’, divided by the variance of the focal allele in the 
population Z, or 𝑅 = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑧, 𝑧′) 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑍)⁄ . This can be interpreted as the extent to which 
the genotype of any given FI in the population matches that of its partner, divided by the 
extent to which the genotypes of any two random individuals in the population match. 
This regression form of R has fewer limitations than Wright’s coefficient of relationship. 
If, for example, the FI and partner are less related than two random individuals in the 
population, the resulting R would be negative. With this less restrictive measurement of 
relatedness, we can now model behaviours like spite, which tend to involve negative R 
values (Gardner and West 2004). I will be using this formula of R for my methods. 
1.3 Controversy of inclusive fitness theory 
Hamilton’s inclusive fitness theory has often been cited as ‘revolutionizing’ the study of 
social behaviours (e.g., Michod 1982), and its utility has been supported in numerous 
studies (Bourke 2014). Despite this, controversy has surrounded Hamilton’s work for 
decades. Perhaps the most famous source of disagreement is the so-called ‘haplodiploidy 
hypothesis’. In his 1964 papers, Hamilton discussed the prevalence of high relatedness 
values between haplodiploid eusocial insect workers: full-sibling workers in these 
colonies often show R values of 0.75 at any given locus (as opposed to 0.5 in full sibling 
diploids). According to Hamilton (in 1964, at least), this high relatedness might help 
explain why eusociality is so prevalent in haplodiploid hymenopterans. At the time, 
however, Hamilton failed to recognize the resulting lower relatedness between sisters and 
brothers in haplodiploids (0.25). Several critics of inclusive fitness theory leapt at this 
oversight, treating it as key evidence that Hamilton’s rule was incorrect (for example, see 
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Wilson 2005, Nowak et al. 2010). Hamilton’s haplodiploidy idea is not required for 
inclusive fitness to work however, despite the insistence otherwise by some (Foster et al. 
2006, Gardner et al. 2011). 
Another source of confusion regarding the utility of Hamilton’s rule involves the 
perceived requirement of additive fitness effects. When the fitness effects of a social 
interaction are additive, the change in fitness to the FI after an interaction with its partner 
is equal to the sum of the fitness effects of each individual’s behaviour. For example, if 
the FI’s behaviour increases its own fitness by X, and the partner’s behaviour increases 
the FI’s fitness by Y, the additive fitness effect of a social interaction between the FI and 
its partner would be X + Y. If there is a synergistic effect, however, and the combined 
behaviours of the FI and its partner result in a fitness effect greater than (or alternatively, 
less than) X + Y, then the fitness effects of their behaviours would be considered 
nonadditive. Several authors (e.g., Queller 1992, Fletcher and Doebeli 2006, Nowak et al. 
2010) have argued that there is an implicit assumption of additive fitness effects in 
Hamilton’s rule, with many regarding B and C to be additive fitness parameters that can 
be freely and independently varied in any given model. This has led some (e.g., Queller 
1992) to believe that a third fitness parameter, sometimes labeled D, must be added to 
Hamilton’s rule to represent nonadditive or synergistic effects not included in B and C. In 
reality, B and C are regression coefficients derived from a least-squares regression 
analysis, the formulas for which encapsulate both additive and nonadditive fitness effects 
(see full derivation in sections 2.1 and 2.2) (Gardner et al. 2011). As explained in 
Gardner et al. (2011), alternative inclusive fitness models that partition the nonadditive 
and additive fitness effects, such as those described by Queller (1992), are still useful for 
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understanding how different components of inclusive fitness influence selection. The 
point here is that Hamilton’s rule is still valid with nonadditive effects, which are already 
encapsulated by Hamilton’s original coefficients B and C. In fact, different types of 
fitness effects can be partitioned out of these coefficients directly, the methods for which 
I will describe in Section 2.2. 
1.4 Applications 
Despite ample criticism, Hamilton’s inclusive fitness theory was eventually widely 
supported by evolutionary geneticists and is considered to have significantly contributed 
to the Modern Synthesis and the genetical theory of natural selection. Prominent 
supporters of inclusive fitness, such as George C. Williams (who was among the first to 
support the theory publicly), hail Hamilton’s rule for its wide applicability and utility for 
understanding the evolution of adaptation and social behaviours (Bourke 2011, Boomsma 
2016). As discussed above, Hamilton’s rule can be applied not only to cooperative and 
altruistic behaviours, but also selfish and spiteful ones, depending on the values of R, B 
and C. This formula is not limited to the study of theory either – Hamilton’s rule can be 
applied to real-world data to investigate the mechanisms behind the evolution of a wide 
variety of behaviours. Loeb (2002), for example, used Hamilton’s rule to study the 
evolution of egg dumping in the lace bug Gargaphia solani, and found the fitness effects 
of this behaviour support it being altruistic (as opposed to selfish or cooperative) in 
nature. These practical applications of Hamilton’s rule help to answer specific questions 
about social behaviour, often with a focus on specific organisms. Theoretical 
applications, by contrast, look to explore the overarching mechanisms behind the 
evolution of such behaviours – the why and how as it applies to all life on earth. Theory 
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provides the foundation for practical research to build from – Hamilton’s inclusive fitness 
theory, for example, has illuminated the importance of indirect fitness effects in the 
evolution of some social behaviours.  
Since Hamilton’s original 1964 papers, some evolutionary theorists have worked to 
further investigate the evolution of social behaviours through inclusive fitness models. It 
is now well understood that inclusive fitness plays an important role in behaviours such 
as altruism and spite, but how does that manifest in life? Questions of dispersal by 
individuals from their natal sites, the conditional expression of genes for social 
behaviours, gene penetrance, intra-genomic conflicts, and many more have been 
investigated and are still being explored via inclusive fitness models. Charlesworth 
(1978), for example, compared models of the evolution of altruistic behaviour by means 
of parental manipulation (in which reproductive mothers influence their offspring to 
behave altruistically) and kin selection, where individuals behaved altruistically towards 
their siblings with a specified probability. The results of these models revealed several 
interesting implications, such as how the B and C values required for altruism to evolve 
are influenced by the probability of expressing altruism. This makes sense for the model 
because, as Charlesworth himself (1978) put it: 
“The higher the probability of expression of the gene for altruistic behaviour, the 
higher the probability that the sibs being helped do not carry the gene, or that if 
they do, they themselves express it and suffer the concomitant loss in fitness.” 
Charlesworth calls these models “crude” because – as many models do – they require 
broad assumptions that leave out important aspects of the modeled organism’s life 
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history. Despite this, his and many theoretical works allow for a better understanding of 
specific aspects of behavioural evolution. While any one study cannot give us a full 
picture of how, for example, altruistic behaviour evolves, each investigation can 
illuminate pieces of the puzzle which, together, paint a larger picture. 
Another example of research ‘illuminating a piece of the puzzle’ regarding the evolution 
of altruism is Parker’s (1989) research on role-based conditional expression. In nature, 
there are many circumstances in which animals may fall into different roles; birth order 
(or age), territory establishment (owner or invader), size (assuming correlation of 
nutrition with size), and social status are all examples of potential asymmetric roles 
between interacting individuals which generally do not involve differing genotypes. This 
is important for the study of altruism because in many cases, an individual will behave 
altruistically or not depending on an environmental stimulus such as asymmetric roles. In 
honeybees (Apis mellifera), for example, larvae differentially develop into queens or 
workers depending on the diet they are fed by nurse bees (Mao et al. 2015). The 
conditional expression of social behaviours like altruism is thus an important aspect to 
study, and while Charlesworth (1978) used a probability of expression to this end, Parker 
(1989) explored this concept by dividing his model population into roles X and Y. 
Several examples are explored in the paper, but in essence, individuals that possess a 
specific allele or genotype for a given behaviour are modeled such that they only express 
the behaviour associated with their genotype when in a specific role. For example, in the 
sibling competition models, carriers of Parker’s hypothetical focal allele will take more 
resources than their siblings when in role X, but not when in role Y.  
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1.5 Developing Inclusive Fitness Theory 
In this thesis I aim to expand upon the current understanding of conditionally expressed 
social behaviours by developing a general inclusive fitness model based on the methods 
of Gardner et al. (2011). In the model building process, I describe how Hamilton’s Rule 
can be derived from a general evolutionary model, the Price equation, and introduce the 
variables B and C in Hamilton’s Rule as partial regression coefficients of fitness and 
genotype (see sections 2.1 and 2.2). I then begin the development of my model by 
describing a basic structure for the scenarios I will be modelling, identifying the 
parameters involved, and assigning appropriate variables for each component – 
collectively called my Model Foundation (Section 2.3). Using the variables and formulae 
compiled in my model foundation, I find mathematical expressions for the partial 
regression coefficients B and C in Hamilton’s Rule (see Section 2.4). I then apply these 
expressions to Hamilton’s rule (as derived from the Price equation) and describe the 
sociobiological significance of each component of the resulting formula, with particular 
emphasis on the coefficient of relatedness, R, as described by Michod and Hamilton 
(1980), and a coefficient of synergetic pairings, S (see Section 2.5).  
After assembling a base model structure, I explore several themes of conditionally 
expressed social behaviours touched upon by previous researchers such as Parker (1989) 
and Charlesworth (1978), and consider effects that were not included in previous 
inclusive fitness models. From Parker’s work I adopt a similar concept of ‘roles’ for my 
model, such that individuals occupy one of two different roles in an interaction. In nature, 
these roles could represent any asymmetry between the two interactants, such as habitat 
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defense vs invasion, food availability, age, birth order, etc., which may influence the 
conditional expression of a focal social behaviour.  
Current inclusive fitness papers modelling conditionally-expressed social behaviours 
often do so in such a way where the ‘condition’ – the stimulus influencing a behaviour’s 
expression – is allocated at random, or with a given probability, without consideration of 
the genotype of the focal individual. In other words, these models do not allow for gene-
environment interactions that bias an individual’s likelihood of exposure to an 
environmental stimulus. For example, in Parker’s (1989) role-dependent expression 
model, he explicitly states “To obey Hamilton’s rule, roles must be assigned randomly 
with respect to the genotype of the pair of relatives, and a gene must be expressed in one 
role only; i.e. its expression must be conditional upon role.” Given that Hamilton’s 
inclusive fitness theory was somewhat inspired by the behaviours of social insects 
(Grafen 2004), it is understandable why Parker and others may have made this 
assumption. Until relatively recently, it was assumed that eusocial insect castes, such as 
workers and queens, were determined entirely by environmental factors such as diet, or 
the presence of specific pheromones (Schwander et al. 2010). Intuitively, this seems to 
make sense; if castes were genetically determined, queens would be unable to produce 
non-reproductive castes like workers, and these non-reproductive castes would rapidly go 
extinct. With the allowance of conditional gene action (or conditional behaviour 
expression), we may once more consider the prospect of genes influencing the 
determination of caste – i.e., gene-environment interaction.  
To include the possibility of a gene-environment interaction in my model, I introduce a 
third key variable in addition to the coefficient of relatedness R and the synergistic 
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pairings coefficient S, called the ‘asymmetry quotient,’ Q. The asymmetry quotient 
accounts for genetic bias in role by measuring the proportion of individuals carrying a 
focal allele that are found disproportionately in one role over another. To use Parker’s 
roles X and Y (discussed in section 1.4) as an example, Q in Parker’s model could be 
calculated by taking the number of individuals with the focal allele that are in role X in a 
heterogeneous pairing divided by the total number of individuals with the focal allele in a 
heterogeneous pairing. This calculation can be done with either role as the point of focus 
(i.e., it does not matter whether role X or Y is used in the formula, so long as the role 
used is consistent throughout the model). 
With a base model structure with roles assembled, I apply my model to two example 
social evolution scenarios for illustrative purposes. The first scenario, named the 
‘Hawk/Dove/Bourgeois Game’ (or HDB for short), is based on Maynard Smith’s game 
theory model of the same name, and describes the evolutionary dynamics between three 
different behaviour strategies, Hawk, Dove, and Bourgeois, which are adopted by 
individuals when either defending a territory from, or invading the territory of, another 
individual. Inclusive fitness models are often used to investigate social behaviours like 
cooperation, altruism, and occasionally spite, but they are less frequently used for selfish 
behaviours like territory defense. In applying my model to a modified form (see section 
3.1) of Maynard Smith’s HDB game, I hope to show that inclusive fitness models can 
provide insight into how factors like relatedness, synergy, and gene-environment 
interactions can influence the evolution of what seems to be purely selfish behaviour. The 
second scenario I apply my model to is of my own design, and explores the evolution of a 
conditionally expressed altruistic behaviour that is prone to some degree of ‘error’ in its 
16 
 
conditional expression. In this scenario, ‘altruism’ is defined as a behaviour that reduces 
the fitness of the FI behaving altruistically and increases the fitness of a social partner 
that shares the same focal allele. I integrate a modified form of Charlesworth’s (1978) 
‘penetrance’ value here, where instead of a probability of expression as Charlesworth 
used, I apply a frequency of error, e (see section 3.2), such that individuals make errors in 
their expression of altruism with frequency e. These errors are meant to represent any 
roadblocks in a FI’s lifetime that prevent it from expressing altruism towards relatives. 
For example, one type of error would be misidentifying an unrelated social partner as a 
relative, and behaving altruistically towards that non-relative.  
With the two example applications of my model described, I explain the results in detail, 














2 Model Description 
In the following sections I derive the two main formulae upon which my model is built: 
the Price equation and Hamilton’s rule. I begin with a description of the basic variables 
involved in the Price equation, and how to build Price’s formula using these components. 
I then show how Hamilton’s rule can be derived from a simple rearrangement of the Price 
equation using regression coefficients of fitness and genotype. Following this, I describe 
the various parameters involved in my own application of the Price equation, called my 
model foundation, and how to find expressions for the aforementioned regression 
coefficients using these parameters. Once my base formula is created, I explain how the 
model can be simplified by rearranging it to include the variables R and S, which allow 
for more intuitive interpretation of results. This more simplified formula is explained in 
sociobiological terms, and I introduce the new component I wish to add to the formula, 
Q, to describe fitness effects not clearly represented in the base form of the model. 
2.1 The Price equation 
To construct my inclusive fitness model, I begin with a formula developed by Price 
(1970) that has been used by various researchers – including Hamilton himself (Hamilton 
1970) – to describe the allele frequency change, ∆p, resulting from natural selection and 
other evolutionary forces (e.g., mutation). To derive Price’s formula, consider first a 
simplified scenario involving a population of N haploid, asexual organisms. Each 
individual i (where i = 1, 2, …N) in the F0 (parent) generation has a genotypic value Zi, 
where Zi = 1 indicates that individual i possesses a focal allele, and Zi = 0 indicates that i 
does not possess this allele. Fitness Wi for each individual in this model is expressed as 
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the number of offspring produced, thus Wi = 2 indicates individual i contributes two 
offspring to the F1 (daughter) generation. The average genotypic value of i's offspring 
can be found with Zi + ∆Zi, where ∆Zi is the average difference in genotypic value 
between i and i's offspring. This difference in genotypic value in a diploid, sexual 
population could be the result of individual i’s offspring inheriting a different allele from 
the other parent, but in this haploid, asexual scenario differences in genotypic value 
between parent and offspring may be caused by mutation. Table 2.1 illustrates how these 
data may be laid out for analysis purposes.  
Table 2.1. Example dataset of hypothetical population described for model building, 
where i denotes a number label for each individual from 1 to N. Data in each row 
correspond to the individual i in the far-left column. Zi is the genotypic value of 
individual i, such that a Zi of 1 indicates that individual i possesses the focal allele, 
and a Zi of 0 indicates that it does not. Wi is the number offspring produced by 
individual i. Zi’ is the average genotypic value of i's offspring, calculated by 
summing Zi and ΔZi, which is the average difference in genotypic value between i 
and i's offspring. 
i Zi Wi Zi’ = Zi + ΔZi 
1 1 2 1 – 0.5 
2 0 5 0 + 0 
3 1 3 1 + 0 
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ 




To find the change in allele frequency Δp, or p’ – p, we first calculate p, which is 




1 Similarly, allele frequency for 
the F1 generation, p’,  can be calculated by multiplying fitness Wi, or the number of 
offspring produced by i, with the average genotype of i’s offspring, Zi', summed across 
all is and divided by the number of individuals in the F1 generation, N’. We can easily 
find the size of the F1 generation by summing all Wi values, thus 𝑝′ = ∑ 𝑊𝑖(𝑍𝑖′)/ ∑ 𝑊𝑖, 
which can be rewritten (by multiplying the numerator and denominator by 
1
𝑁′
) as 𝑝′ =
𝐸[𝑊𝑍]+𝐸[𝑊𝛥𝑍]
𝐸[𝑊]

















 The expected value of a random variable, X, is the sum of all the values X may take on weighted by the 
probability that X will take on that value. In many cases, this can be considered the same as the weighted 
average of X. For this thesis, I will use the terms “expected value” and “average” interchangeably to 
describe parts of my models. In the current example, each individual i contributes equally to the population 





 Note: The covariance of two random variables, in this case W and Z, is defined as the expected product of 
the individual values minus expected values of each variable, or Cov(W,Z) = E[(Wi – E[W])(Zi – E[Z])]. 
This formula can be simplified to E[WZ] – E[W]E[Z] (see full derivation in Appendix). Thus, Equation 1 
has been simplified as follows: 





𝐸[𝑊𝑍] − 𝐸[𝑊]𝐸[𝑍] + 𝐸[𝑊𝛥𝑍]
𝐸[𝑊]
=





This final simplified version is the Price equation. The first term in Equation 2 describes 
the partial change in allele frequency due to selection, ∆𝑠𝑝 =
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑊,𝑍)
𝐸[𝑊]
, as a covariance 
between individual fitness, W and genotypic value, Z, for all individuals in the population 
divided by the average population fitness. The second term describes the partial change in 
allele frequency due to other, non-selective effects such as mutation, drive, or even 
cultural transmission (Price 1970; Gardner 2008). Interpreting the above expression is 
relatively straightforward: assuming that the effects of transmission bias (differences in 
genotypic and/or phenotypic value between parents and offspring) are small (though this 
may not always be the case), and because average fitness cannot be negative, we may 
simply focus on the sign of the covariance expression. A positive covariance between W 
and Z indicates an increase in frequency of the focal allele due to selective action, while a 
negative covariance indicates a decrease due to selection against the focal allele. The 
covariance in Price’s formula is valuable in its intuitively appealing results: if carrying a 
focal allele is positively correlated with fitness, one would naturally expect the frequency 
of this allele to increase. 
2.2 Regression 
An alternative form of the Price equation, which may appeal more to quantitative 
geneticists, involves multiplying the variance of the focal allele by a regression 











where βWZ = Cov(W,Z)/Var(Z) (Gardner et al. 2011). This format allows us to consider 
the partial change in allele frequency due to selection, ∆𝑠𝑝, as a selection gradient 
multiplied by the genetic variance of the population, weighted by the population average 
fitness. To develop my own model predictions in an inclusive fitness context, I will 
employ an alternative approach to analyzing this regression form of the Price equation 
with my model data. Because I am focusing specifically on changes in allele frequency 
due to selective effects in my models, I will from this point be referring solely to the ∆𝑠𝑝 
formula, and omit the second term of Price’s original equation. 
Describing the inclusive fitness effects of a hypothetical allele which influences social 
behaviour (henceforth called a ‘social allele’ for short) involves not only considering how 
a focal individual’s (FI) behaviour will affect its own fitness, but also how any social 
partners’ (other individuals interacting, either indirectly or directly, with the FI) 
behaviours will indirectly affect the FI’s fitness. The coefficient in Equation 3 can be 
partitioned into two for this purpose, such that one coefficient represents the partial 
regression of the FI’s fitness on its own genotype (𝛽𝑊,𝑍|𝑧 = 𝛽𝐹𝐼) and the other represents 
the partial regression of the FI’s fitness on the genotype of a social partner (𝛽𝑊,𝑍|𝑧′ =
𝛽𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡), which gives 
∆𝑠𝑝 =





Each of the coefficients is multiplied by its respective genotype covariance: 𝛽𝐹𝐼 with the 
covariance of its own genotype, i.e. the variance of the focal allele (Cov(z,z)=var(Z)), and 
𝛽𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡 with the covariance of the FI’s genotype on its social partner’s genotype. With the 
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understanding that the average genetic relatedness between social partners, R, is defined 







(Gardner et al. 2011). This formula is, in essence, Hamilton’s rule: so long as 𝛽𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑅 >
𝛽𝐹𝐼, ∆𝑠𝑝 will be positive and the focal allele will increase in frequency over one 
generation. If one were to consider this formula in the context of altruistic behaviours, 
𝛽𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡 would be Hamilton’s benefit term, B, and 𝛽𝐹𝐼 would be cost, C (Gardner, 2008). 
The interpretation of 𝛽𝐹𝐼 and 𝛽𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡 here is straightforward when considering only 
additive fitness effects from interactions, meaning that we assume the resulting fitness to 
the FI after an interaction is equal to the sum of the fitness effects of the FI’s behaviour 
and its social partner’s behaviour. In this case, 𝛽𝐹𝐼 would simply measure the average 
difference in residual (individual minus average) fitness to the FI when it possesses the 
focal allele versus when it does not. The term 𝛽𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡 would then measure the average 
change in residual fitness to the FI when its partner possesses the focal allele versus 
when it does not. If, however, the total fitness effect of an interaction is not equal to the 
sum of the individual fitness effects of the FI and partner’s behaviours (i.e. it is 
nonadditive), the above formula remains valid (Gardner et al. 2011; Queller 1992) but the 
interpretation of each coefficient becomes more complicated, because (in a departure 
from Hamilton’s original formulation) coefficients depend directly on allele frequency. 
If, for example, two carriers of the focal allele interact more effectively than 
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heterogeneous (carrier with non-carrier) pairings, the total fitness effect on the FI may be 
greater than simply the sum of the individual fitness effects. 
To find the mathematical expressions for 𝛽𝐹𝐼 and 𝛽𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡 which encompass both the 
additive and nonadditive fitness effects of the social behaviours I wish to model, I will 
first describe an evolutionary “game” outlining the rules that will act as the foundation of 
my model. 
2.3 Model Foundation 
Consider a finite population of haploid, asexual organisms, each of which, at one point in 
its lifetime, engages in a pairwise interaction with another individual in the population. 
The behaviour of an individual during this interaction is controlled by a single locus 
where genotype Z = 0 indicates possession of the wild-type allele (A0), and Z = 1 
indicates the mutant allele (A1). Interactions of each type occur at frequency 𝐹𝑧+𝑧′. 
Therefore, interactions between two carriers of the mutant allele A1 occur with frequency 
F2, interactions between two carriers of the wild-type allele A0 occur with frequency F0, 
and interactions between one A1 carrier and one A0 carrier occur with frequency F1. Each 
individual i may experience a fitness cost or benefit dependent on its own behaviour and 
that of its partner. 
The frequency of allele A1, E[Z], in the F0 generation can be calculated by summing the 
frequency values of all pairings involving A1 carriers weighted by the frequency of A1 
interactants in each pairing, giving 𝐸[𝑍]= F2 + ½F1. Average fitness E[W] in the F0 
population can be similarly calculated by taking the fitness outcome to the FI in an 
interaction weighted by the frequency of that pair summed across all interactions.  
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2.4 Mean Squared Error 
The expressions for 𝛽𝐹𝐼 and 𝛽𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡 in Equation 5 can now be obtained using the formulae 
outlined in the previous section. Note that there are four possible residual fitness (Wi – 
E[W]) outcomes that can be calculated using the input values in section 2.3, one for each 
possible interaction type that a focal individual can have (interactions between A1 and A0 
carriers account for two of these, one for each type of FI in this pair). These fitness 
outcomes are not separated into those resulting from the FI’s behaviour or that of its 
partner, and thus may be less informative in this form. To partition residual fitness 
outcomes into the coefficients 𝛽𝐹𝐼 and 𝛽𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡, I fit these coefficients such that they fulfill 
the same function in the model as each of the observed residual fitness values. I 
accomplish this by finding the mean squared error (MSE), which calculates the average 
squared difference between a set of estimated values and the observed values being 
estimated. The fitted residual fitness values used to calculate the MSE are expressed 
using the 𝛽𝐹𝐼 and 𝛽𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡 coefficients in the following formula: 
𝑊𝐹𝐼 − 𝐸[𝑊] = 𝛽𝐹𝐼(𝑧 − 𝐸[𝑍]) + 𝛽𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑧
′ − 𝐸[𝑍]). 
(6) 
All fitted and observed residual fitness values are laid out in Table 2.2, labelled DObs and 
DFit respectively (uppercase D is used to remind us that we are comparing the difference 





Table 2.2. Expressions used to develop the MSE formula. Fitness and genotype 
values from each row correspond to a specific focal individual in each pair. For 






𝑫𝑶𝒃𝒔𝒛𝒛′ = 𝑾𝑭𝑰 − 𝑬[𝑾] 𝑫𝑭𝒊𝒕𝒛𝒛′ = 𝜷𝑭𝑰(𝒛 − 𝑬[𝒁]) + 𝜷𝑷𝒂𝒓𝒕(𝒛
′ − 𝑬[𝒁]) 
𝑨𝟏 + 𝑨𝟏 𝐹2 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠11 𝛽𝐹𝐼(1 − 𝐸[𝑍]) + 𝛽𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡(1 − 𝐸[𝑍]) 
𝑨𝟏 + 𝑨𝟎 
𝐹1
2
 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠10 𝛽𝐹𝐼(1 − 𝐸[𝑍]) + 𝛽𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡(0 − 𝐸[𝑍]) 
𝑨𝟎 + 𝑨𝟏 
𝐹1
2
 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠01 𝛽𝐹𝐼(0 − 𝐸[𝑍]) + 𝛽𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡(1 − 𝐸[𝑍]) 
𝑨𝟎 + 𝑨𝟎 𝐹0 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠00 𝛽𝐹𝐼(0 − 𝐸[𝑍]) + 𝛽𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡(0 − 𝐸[𝑍]) 
 
Using the 𝐹𝑧+𝑧′ values to weigh each partial squared difference, I derive the MSE using 
the formula3 
                 𝑀𝑆𝐸 = ∑ 𝐹𝑧+𝑧′(𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠 − 𝐷𝐹𝑖𝑡)
2










+ 𝐹0(𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠00 − 𝐷𝐹𝑖𝑡00)
2 
(7) 
where 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠 𝑧𝑧′ and 𝐷𝐹𝑖𝑡 𝑧𝑧′ represent the observed and fitted residual fitnesses 
respectively of a focal individual with genotype z whose partner possesses genotype z’.  
 
3
 Note that F1 here is divided in two, because half of the interactants in heterogeneous pairs are A1 carriers, 
and half are A0 carriers. 
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Using the mathematics program Maple (2020) to carry out the calculations, I determine 
the expressions for 𝛽𝐹𝐼 and 𝛽𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡 which minimize Equation 7 (the mean squared error 
between the observed residual fitnesses and those predicted by Equation 6) (see equations 
8a and 8b in appendix). While the expressions resulting from my MSE analysis can be 
substituted directly into Equation 5 for calculation purposes, they are difficult to interpret 
in this form. In the following section, I will illustrate simplifications that can be used to 
interpret the outcomes of selection studied with this type of social behaviour model. 
2.5 Sociobiological Interpretation 
To make the interpretation of a somewhat unwieldy, large equation more intuitive, we 
may assign simplifying variables to represent some of the frequency-dependent 
components of a formula. With these modifications, the interacting dynamics of the 
model can be more easily described using sociobiological language, as opposed to purely 
frequency-dependent terms. For my model, I focused on isolating two key variables 
frequently used in inclusive fitness analyses: relatedness, R, which I have previously 
defined in Section 2.2 as 𝑅 = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑧, 𝑧′) 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑍)⁄  (see Equation 5), and synergy, S. 
Fitness effects may be considered synergistic if the combined effect of two interacting 
individuals is greater than (or conversely, less than) the sum of the effects caused 
independently by each interactant. In this model, I focus on the synergistic effects 
resulting from the interaction of two A1 individuals. The proportion of individuals with 
the focal allele, A1, that interact with an A1-carrying social partner can be written as 
𝐹2 𝑝⁄ . Assigning the variable S to this fraction (i.e., 𝑆 = 𝐹2 𝑝⁄ ) provides a means of 
weighting synergistic fitness effects by the frequency at which A1 carriers are in a 
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homogeneous pairing. Using the synergy coefficient S in combination with Hamilton’s 
coefficient of relationship R, expressions (8a) and (8b) may be rearranged as follows: 
𝛽𝐹𝐼 =










Focusing on the first portion of the formula in Equation 5 again, and replacing the beta 
coefficients there with the above expressions, I find4 
∆𝑠𝑝 ∝ 𝑅(𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠01  −  𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠00) + 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠10  −  𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠00
+ 𝑆((𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠11  −  𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠10) − (𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠01  −  𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠00)) 
(10) 
Unlike equations 8a and 8b, the above formula can be more easily broken into the 
specific behavioural phenomena at play. The first component, 𝑅(𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠01 – 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠00), can 
be broken into the two factors, R and (𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠01 – 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠00), the latter of which can be 
interpreted as the difference in additive direct fitness effects to individuals when their 
partner is switched from an A0 to A1 carrier. In other words, this measures how an 
 
4
 The symbol ∝ used in Equation 10 indicates “proportional to,” meaning the change in p is proportional to 
the right-hand side of the equation. 
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individual’s fitness is affected by a partner exhibiting wild type behaviour (A0) compared 
to mutant behaviour (A1). To understand how these effects influence the mutant’s own 
fitness, I multiply by R, a measure of the extent to which interactants are more related to 
each other than two random individuals in the population. In doing so, our perspective is 
then redirected to the A1 carrier itself, and the resulting product measures the difference 
in additive indirect fitness effects to A1 carriers in comparison to A0 carriers. It is helpful 
here to consider a hypothetical scenario where individuals are somehow able to ‘will’ 
their alleles to change – in which case the first component would measure the change in 
additive indirect fitness effects to individuals that ‘switch’ their social allele from A0 to 
A1.  
The second component in Equation 10,  𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠10 – 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠00, is the difference in additive 
direct fitness effects between A0 and A1 carriers. Following the above hypothetical 
scenario, this could be thought of as the change in additive direct fitness effects to 
individuals that ‘switch’ their social allele from A0 to A1.  
The third component in Equation 10, 𝑆((𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠11 – 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠10) − (𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠01 – 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠00)) 
encapsulates the nonadditive fitness effects resulting from pairings between two A1 
carriers, i.e. the synergistic effects. This can be expanded slightly for explanatory 
purposes to 𝑆((𝐷𝑜𝑏𝑠11 − 𝐷𝑜𝑏𝑠00) − (𝐷𝑜𝑏𝑠10 − 𝐷𝑜𝑏𝑠00) − (𝐷𝑜𝑏𝑠01 − 𝐷𝑜𝑏𝑠00)). In 
this expanded form, we can see that the synergistic component first takes the difference 
in fitness effects to A1 carriers in homogeneous pairings – that is, pairings consisting of 
individuals with the same social allele – and fitness effects to A0 carriers in homogeneous 
pairings, or (𝐷𝑜𝑏𝑠11 − 𝐷𝑜𝑏𝑠00). From this expression, both the direct (𝐷𝑜𝑏𝑠10 −
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𝐷𝑜𝑏𝑠00) and indirect (𝐷𝑜𝑏𝑠01 − 𝐷𝑜𝑏𝑠00) additive effects are subtracted such that only 
the nonadditive effects remain. Considering again the hypothetical allele switching 
scenario, we may consider the synergistic component to be measured as the change in 
fitness effects to individuals when both they and their partner simultaneously ‘switch’ 
their social allele from A0 to A1, minus the additive effects described above. The result is 
then weighted by S, because these effects are only experienced by A1 carriers in 
homogeneous pairings. When simplified, the synergistic component becomes 
𝑆((𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠11 – 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠10) − (𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠01 – 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠00)), as shown above. 
In its current form, Equation 10 is informative in its ability to partition the fitness effects 
of an allele for social behaviour into additive and nonadditive parts while also providing 
insight into the influence that both relatedness between interactants (R) and proportion of 
synergistic pairings (S) have on allele frequency. As is, the model contains factors that 
describe the dynamics between a FI’s genotype and that of its social partner. What is 
missing, however, is a descriptor for the dynamics between a FI’s genotype and its 
environment, i.e., a measure of gene-environment interaction effects.  
To incorporate environmental effects in my model, I designate a role label to each 
individual in an interacting pair, labelled P1 and P2. ‘Role’ here will be used to represent 
a difference in environmental stimulus experienced by a FI in comparison to the stimulus 
experienced by the FI’s social partner. In other words, roles P1 and P2 will be used to 
model an environmental asymmetry between the FI and its partner that causes them to 
differentially express their behaviour depending on the role they occupy. This asymmetry 
can be thought of as, for example, a difference in size (nourishment), territory defender 
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versus invader, birth order, or any other asymmetry that may occur that is not a direct 
result of genetic differences between individuals.  
To quantify a measure of gene-environment interaction, I assign a new simplifying 
variable, Q, which describes the proportion of individuals carrying a focal allele – in this 
case, A1 – that are disproportionately found in one role over another. This asymmetry 
quotient provides insight into the significance of gene-environment interaction effects on 
the evolution of a social behaviour. 
Consider, for example, an asymmetric game in which individuals in the P1 role have an 
advantage over those in role P2, such as already owning (as opposed to seeking) a 
territory which positively influences fitness of the territory holder. If alleles A1 and A0 
are associated with differing territory invasion and/or defense behaviours, then an 
asymmetry in the proportion of A1 carriers in each role may have an influence on which 
allele outcompetes the other. In the following chapter I will go through a few example 
applications of my model, illustrating how different levels of gene-environment 








The final model built and described in Chapter 2 (Equation 10) is a generalized formula 
that can be applied to a wide variety of social behaviours, including behaviours that are 
not typically associated with inclusive fitness theory such as aggression or territory 
defense. The model does not require a kin selection effect to be applicable, but it can help 
reveal whether relatedness or synergy play a part in the selection for (or conversely, 
against) a social behaviour. The asymmetry quotient Q is not included in this base model 
form, because Q is directly involved in the fitness outcomes of each interaction. If an 
individual’s behaviour – and therefore, its fitness – is influenced by which role it 
occupies, the average fitness outcome of each type of interaction (A1 with A1, A1 with A0, 
etc.) is dependent on the proportion of A1 carriers disproportionately occupying each role, 
which is quantified by Q.  
In the following sections I describe two examples of how my model can be applied to 
social behaviours, and how Q is applied to the fitness outcomes of these behaviours. 
3.1 Hawk/Dove/Bourgeois Game 
In Maynard Smith’s (1982) Hawk-Dove-Bourgeois (HDB) game, an asymmetry is 
described in which the focal individual (FI) occupies one of two roles: owner or invader 
of a resource which increases an owner’s fitness by amount V. Individuals in a population 
may employ one of three strategies:  
H or “Hawk”: Defend resource (if owner) or fight to obtain resource (if invader) 
until either the individual is injured (in which case the individual would flee, 
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losing the resource) or the opponent retreats. Injury causes the individual to 
experience a fitness cost C. 
D or “Dove”: Retreat before injury (if opponent is H) or share the resource 
without escalation to injury (if opponent is D). 
B or “Bourgeois”: If already owner of the resource, act as H; if invader, act as D.  
For this game, Maynard Smith assumes an infinite, randomly mixing population 
consisting mostly of individuals adopting behaviour strategies H or D, in which a rare 
mutant behaviour B is introduced to the population. The game was initially developed to 
help explain why same-species conflicts rarely result in life-threatening injury (Bacaër 
2011), and therefore was not originally designed with an inclusive fitness context in 
mind. As a result, relatedness is not taken into consideration, and thus individuals do not 
interact with relatives more often than by chance (i.e., R = 0). Using the parameters 
described in the HDB game, Maynard Smith describes the requirements for each 
evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) – a behavioural strategy or phenotype which, when 
adopted by a population, cannot be supplanted by a competing mutant strategy. In his 
original HDB game, Maynard Smith finds that the values of V and C determine which 
strategy is the ESS; when V > C, H is the ESS, and when C > V, B is the ESS.  
In this game, Maynard Smith fails to consider biases in strategies adopted by territory 
owners or invaders. Consider, for example, the fitness outcomes of interactions between 
H and B strategists if B individuals were always territory invaders (and therefore always 
acted like doves)? What if B strategists were always territory owners?  
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To apply the HDB game to my model and explore these possible scenarios, I must make 
some modifications to Maynard Smith’s original design. Because my model is designed 
to compare only two competing alleles at a time (A1 and A0), I combine the two pure 
strategies H and D to create a mixed strategy associated with the allele A0. Similarly to 
Maynard Smith, I will consider B to be the mutant strategy in my model. Territory 
owners and invaders will be considered separate roles, where owners are labelled P1, and 
invaders labelled P2. 
If H is considered to be a strategy employed with frequency h by carriers of the wild-type 
allele A0, D is considered to be a strategy employed with frequency (1 – h) by A0 carriers, 
and B is considered to be a strategy employed by all carriers of the mutant allele A1, the 
fitness payoffs for interactions between A0 and A1 carriers can easily be applied to the Wi 
values as described in Section 2.3. Here, however, Wi values for each interaction are 
partitioned into the fitness outcome to P1 and the fitness outcome to P2, labelled v1zz’ and 
v2zz’, respectively, where z and z’ represent genotypes of P1 and P2. Figure 3.1 illustrates 
how fitness outcomes v1zz’ and v2zz’ are applied to each possible interaction type between 
A1 and A0 carriers in each role. This guide can be used for scenarios other than the 
current HDB game by substituting the placeholder labels v1zz’ and v2zz’ with fitness 




Figure 3.1. A decision tree illustrating the fitness outcomes, labelled v1zz’ and v2zz’, 
to individuals in roles P1 and P2, respectively, following pairwise interactions 
between individuals carrying one of two alleles: the mutant allele A1 or the wild-type 
allele A0. Fitness outcome labels z and z’ indicate the genotypes of individuals in 
roles P1 and P2, respectively, where 1 indicates A1 and 0 indicates A0. 
Thus, v110 represents, for example, the fitness outcome (measured as the number of 
offspring directly produced in the next generation) for P1 in an A1:A0 interaction, and 
v210 is the outcome for P2 in that same interaction. As there are now four distinct 
interaction types when role is taken into account (A1:A1, A1:A0, A0:A1, and A0:A0), 
interaction frequencies for each type will now be labelled fzz’. 
The resulting fitness outcomes from Maynard Smith’s HDB game to resource owners, 
P1, and resource invaders, P2, upon enacting either strategy H or D, is illustrated in Figure 
3.2 below. Strategy B is not labelled here explicitly, as individuals employing this 




Figure 3.2. A decision tree illustrating the fitness outcomes – V indicating an 
increase in fitness, C indicating a fitness decrease – to individuals in roles P1 and P2, 
respectively, following pairwise interactions between individuals employing one of 
two strategies: H or D. Genotype labels z and z’ for each fitness outcome are not 
specified here. 
To vary the level of bias in the genotypic composition of each role (i.e., to vary the level 
of gene-environment interaction), I designate a mathematical expression for the 
asymmetry quotient, Q. In this model, the focal (or mutant) allele is A1, and roles are 
assigned labels P1 and P2. As described in section 1.5, Q is found by taking the number 
of individuals with the focal allele that are in a focal role in a heterogeneous (A1:A0) 
pairing, divided by the total number of individuals with the focal allele in a 
heterogeneous pairing. For this example, P2 will be the focal role, and therefore 𝑄 =
𝑓01/(𝑓01 + 𝑓10). 
Table 3.1 below outlines the average fitness outcomes, v1zz’ and v2zz’ to interactants in 
roles P1 and P2 respectively, for all possible allele and strategy combinations. Note that 
Q is integrated into these fitness outcomes, because the average fitness outcome to, for 
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example, A1 carriers in heterogeneous pairings, is dependent on how frequently A1 
carriers are found in each role. 
Table 3.1. Average fitness outcomes – V indicating an increase in fitness, C 
indicating a fitness decrease – to individuals carrying either allele A0 or A1 and 
occupying either role P1 or P2 following pairwise interactions of each possible pair 
type. For example, the average fitness outcome to P2 in an A0:A1 pairing, or v201, is 
(1-h)V/2. Because A0 carriers employ H with frequency h and D with frequency (1 – 
h), the average fitness outcome to P2 (which, as a B invader, is employing D) is 
found by taking the weighted sum of the outcome when A0 enacts H and when it 
enacts D. 
Pair type = zz’ Fitness to P1 = v1 Fitness to P2 = v2 
11 V 0 
10 
(1 − 𝑄) (
ℎ(𝑉 − 𝐶)
2


















Substituting fitness outcomes v1zz’ and v2zz’ from Table 3.1 into the DObszz’ expressions in 
Equation 10 produces 











































𝑅(𝑄 + ℎ − 1)(𝐶ℎ + 𝑉)
2
+
(𝑄 + ℎ − 1)(𝐶ℎ − 𝑉)
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Notice here that both equations 11a and 11b can be broken into the three main partitions 
as seen in Equation 10: additive indirect (𝑅(𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠01 – 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠00)) additive direct 
(𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠10 – 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠00) and nonadditive fitness effects (𝑆((𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠11 – 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠10) −
(𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠01 – 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠00)). I will describe equation 11a first, because its respective parts are 
more easily connected back to Equation 10. To describe the principal results of this 
formula, I will use the simplified form, Equation 11b. 
Beginning with the simplest of the three components in (11a), the additive direct effect 
(𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠10 – 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠00), we can understand the meaning behind the formula by considering a 
hypothetical scenario similar to that discussed in Section 2.4, in which a wild type (WT) 
focal individual is making a unilateral “decision” to switch from the WT strategy of H 
with probability h and D with probability (1 – h) (or the H/D strategy for short), to the 
mutant behaviour B. While obviously in nature organisms cannot ‘will’ their alleles to 
mutate or change suddenly, adaptation of game theory helps us understand the equation 
more intuitively. This allows us to compare the fitness outcomes experienced by A1 
carriers resulting from the mutant behaviour with those experienced by A0 carriers. In 
following this hypothetical scenario, we can consider Q to be the probability of being in 
the P2 role when an individual is making a unilateral decision. Therefore the FI in the 
additive direct effect portion of Equation 11a is P2 (resource invader) with probability Q 
and P1 (resource owner) with probability (1 – Q). Following Table 3.1, the fitness payoff 
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received by the FI here is5 𝑄(1 − ℎ)𝑉/2 + (1 − 𝑄)(ℎ(𝑉 − 𝐶)/2 + (1 − ℎ)𝑉). Had the 
FI not changed behavioural strategies, it would have received a fitness payoff of ℎ2(𝑉 −
𝐶))/2 + ℎ(1 − ℎ)𝑉 + (1 − ℎ)2 𝑉/2, which simplifies to (𝑉 − ℎ2𝐶)/2. To calculate the 
change in fitness to the FI caused by the switch in behavioural strategies, or 
(𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠10 – 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠00), we simply subtract the ‘final’ fitness effect from the ‘initial’, as 
shown in the second component of Equation 11a. The result is then the additive direct 
fitness effect to B strategists caused by their mutant behaviour. 
Moving on to the indirect additive effect 𝑅(𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠01 – 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠00), we now imagine a scenario 
where the FI’s partner is switching strategies from H/D to B. This time, Q measures the 
probability that the P2 role is held by the partner as opposed to the FI, because the partner 
here is making the unilateral decision. The fitness payoff received by the FI due to its 
partner’s change in behaviour therefore is 𝑄(ℎ𝑉 + (1 − ℎ)𝑉/2) + (1 − 𝑄)ℎ(𝑉 − 𝐶)/2. 
Had the partner not changed behaviours, the FI’s fitness payoff would have been the 
same as in the additive direct scenario above when the FI did not switch to B and was 
paired with another H/D, or 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠00. The change in fitness to the FI due to its partner’s 
switch in strategies is again calculated by subtracting the ‘final’ (𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠01) minus ‘initial’ 
(𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠00). Here however, the result is multiplied by R, thereby shifting our perspective 
such that the individual switching strategies is now considered the FI, and thus weighing 
the fitness effects which this FI (who switched from H/D to B strategies) by the 
relatedness between the FI and its social partner. The resulting product can then be 
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considered the additive indirect fitness effect to B strategists caused by their mutant 
behaviour. 
Finally proceeding to the nonadditive component, (𝑆((𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠11 – 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠10) −
(𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠01 – 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠00)), we see the exact same simplified form as that described in Equation 
10. With the last three fitness effect terms (𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠10, 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠01, and 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠00) already described 
above, the foremost fitness effect, 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠11, is simply the effect experienced by B strategist 
individuals in homogeneous pairings. Notice that a Q factor is not included here – as both 
individuals in this type of pairing implement the same strategy, B, there can be no bias in 
roles (i.e. half the B strategists in this type of pair are P1, and the other half are P2). 
There is also no h frequency involved, as there are no H/D strategists in this pairing, and 
thus the 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠11 term here is simply V/2. The entire synergy component, when assembled, 
measures all nonadditive (synergistic) fitness effects resulting from homogeneous 
pairings between B strategists. 
What does Equation 11b tell us? To answer this question, I first set up a baseline analysis 
to test whether the results obtained with this model match those of Maynard Smith’s 
(1982) original model. Several assumptions are made in Maynard Smith’s basic Hawk-
Dove- Bourgeois game that can be used to enter values for variables in my own formula 
and recover Maynard Smith’s original results. Mainly, Maynard Smith assumes an 
infinite, random mixing population, with a rare introduced mutant strategy (B) and 
individuals that do not interact with relatives more often than by chance. For my model, 
these assumptions translate to my R and S values being set to zero. In doing so, the first 
and third component of Equation 11b reduce to zero, leaving only the additive direct 
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effect (𝑄 + ℎ − 1)(𝐶ℎ − 𝑉)/2. In his model, Maynard Smith found that when V > C, 
strategy H is the only ‘evolutionarily stable strategy,’ or ESS, a strategy in which, when 
adopted by the entire population, cannot be invaded by other mutant strategies. In other 
words, when V > C in Maynard Smith’s HDB model, strategy H cannot be supplanted 
once fixed in the population. In contrast, when C > V, strategy B is the only ESS in 
Maynard Smith’s model. These same results can be found in the expression (𝑄 + ℎ −
1)(𝐶ℎ − 𝑉)/2 by setting h = 1, meaning that all wild type A0 carriers enact strategy H. 
When this is done, I find that ∆𝑠𝑝 ∝ 𝑄(𝐶 − 𝑉)/2. When V > C, the change in A1 allele 
frequency ∆𝑠𝑝 becomes negative, meaning that strategy H cannot be outcompeted by B 
once it (H) is sufficiently high frequency in the population, and the reverse is true when C 
> V – a rare B can invade a population of individuals playing only H. When h is set to 
zero, ∆𝑠𝑝 is always positive, assuming that strategy (i.e. genotype) is independent of role. 
This assumption was also made by Maynard Smith, and can be adopted here by setting Q 
equal to one-half, meaning that B strategists are equally likely to be territory owners or 
invaders.  
Maynard Smith considered H and D to be pure strategies in his basic HDB model, 
meaning that he considered H and D strategists to be separate entities, as opposed to the 
mixed strategy H/D used in my model. As a result, when considering intermediate values 
of h (between 0 and 1) I find some interesting results. This is more easily shown if the 
additive direct component of Equation 11b is rearranged to (ℎ − (1 − 𝑄))(𝐶ℎ − 𝑉)/2. 
When V > C, ∆𝑠𝑝 is only negative (meaning that A1 allele frequency is decreasing) if 
wild type individuals enact strategy H more frequently than mutants are territory owners 
(h > (1 – Q)). This makes sense because the role occupied by a B strategist dictates its 
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behaviour. If mutants are behaving as H more frequently than wild-type (WT) 
individuals, they have more opportunities to reap the full value of a territory V from 
social partners enacting strategy D. Also, as a higher frequency of enacting strategy H 
involves a lower frequency of enacting D, when mutants behave as H more often than 
wild type individuals (in other words, WT individuals behave as D more than mutants), a 
partner acting as D is more likely to be WT than mutant.  
When C > V, the sign of ∆𝑠𝑝 becomes not only dependent on the relationship between h 
and (1 – Q), but also the ratio of V/C. To understand how each of these variables interact 
to influence the sign of ∆𝑠𝑝, I set the expression (ℎ − (1 − 𝑄))(𝐶ℎ − 𝑉)/2 equal to zero, 
and solve for h, which gives the two expressions stated above: (1 – Q) and V/C. These 
two expressions are linear functions of h which intersect, and between these two 
functions is where ∆𝑠𝑝 becomes negative. For visualization purposes, these functions can 
be plotted in three dimensions using the command plot3d in Maple by setting values for 





Figure 3.3. Two perspectives of a 3D plot of ∆𝒔𝒑, Q, and h, (in colour) when R = 0, S 
= 0, V = 1 and C = 2. A secondary plane (black) at ∆𝒔𝒑 = 0 has been added for 
illustrative purposes.  
 
Figure 3.4. Two perspectives of a 3D plot of ∆𝒔𝒑, Q, and h, (in colour) when R = 0, S 
= 0, V = 3 and C = 4. A secondary plane (black) at ∆𝒔𝒑 = 0 has been added for 









In the secondary (right-hand side) perspectives of each example plot, the functions h = (1 
– Q) and h = V/C are clearly visible as borders through which ∆𝑠𝑝 crosses as it dips 
below zero. Based on the expressions found above and the example figures shown, when 
C > V, ∆𝑠𝑝 is only positive when h is either greater than both V/C and (1 – Q) or when h 
is less than both V/C and (1 – Q). If h is only greater or less than one of these functions 
and not the other, ∆𝑠𝑝 becomes negative. 
One final interesting scenario involving the additive direct component is when h = 0 and 
Q = 1, meaning that B strategists are always playing D, as are mixed strategists 
(individuals choosing H with frequency h, and D with frequency (1 – h)). When this 
occurs, ∆𝑠𝑝 = 0, because selection cannot differentiate between mutants and WTs, as 
both are behaving as D in all interactions. The same goes for when h = 1 and Q = 0, in 
which case both WTs and mutants are behaving as H in all interactions. Based on these 
and the results described above, it is already clear that role is important for modelling 
natural selection, without yet even considering these dynamics in connection to 
relatedness or synergy.  
With the baseline of Maynard Smith’s HDB game established, I can now relax the 
assumptions made earlier, starting with the assumption of a rare mutant allele. As I allow 
the mutant allele A1 to appear more frequently in the population (increasing allele 
frequency p), the likelihood of homogeneous A1 pairs increases, and therefore so does S. 
When S is greater than zero, the nonadditive component of Equation 11b, 𝑆(𝐶ℎ(1 − 𝑄 −
ℎ/2)), influences ∆𝑠𝑝 accordingly. To understand if synergy contributes positively or 
negatively to the change in A1 allele frequency, we may look again at the relationship 
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between h and (1 – Q). Whereas in the additive direct component, the requirements for 
∆𝑠𝑝 to be positive or negative depended on whether (1 – Q) exceeded h or vice-versa, the 
sign of the synergy component seems to more heavily favor a positive ∆𝑠𝑝. For the 
component to contribute positively to ∆𝑠𝑝, (1 – Q) must exceed h/2, meaning that wild-
type individuals must behave as H twice as often as the frequency at which mutants own 
territories (1 – Q) in order for A0 to outcompete A1. These results are interesting, because 
they imply that synergy can significantly influence the selection of certain social 
behaviours, and models which assume only rare alleles with no homogeneous interactions 
may produce different results if those assumptions are relaxed, particularly if role-based 
expression is also considered. 
Finally moving on to relaxing the assumption of random mixing, meaning that R is no 
longer zero (reminder that R may be either positive or negative). The entire additive 
indirect component, 𝑅(𝑄 + ℎ − 1)(𝐶ℎ + 𝑉)/2, contributes to ∆𝑠𝑝 relative to the size and 
sign of R. This component may be rearranged to 𝑅(ℎ − (1 − 𝑄))(𝐶ℎ + 𝑉)/2 for easier 
interpretation, and in doing so it looks similar to the additive direct component described 
previously ((𝑄 + ℎ − 1)(𝐶ℎ − 𝑉)/2), differing only in the sign of V and the factor of R. 
With C and V both positive, whether the additive indirect component contributes 
positively or negatively to ∆𝑠𝑝 – assuming, for now, that R is positive – becomes entirely 
dependent on R and the ratio of h and (1 – Q). This time, however, (1 – Q) exceeding h 
does not contribute positively to ∆𝑠𝑝, but negatively, and the opposite is true for h 
exceeding (1 – Q). Even more interesting is when we consider negative values of R, 
which reverses this dynamic back such that values of (1 – Q) exceeding h cause the 
additive indirect component to contribute positively to ∆𝑠𝑝. To understand the 
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interactions between these variables, I adopt the same methods used for the additive 
direct component. Using arbitrary values for C and V (in this case, I used C = 2 and V = 
1), I set the expression 𝑅(ℎ − (1 − 𝑄))(𝐶ℎ + 𝑉)/2 = 0 and solve for h, which gives the 
expressions (1 – Q) and −(𝑅 − 1)/2(𝑅 + 1). As before, these two expressions are linear 
functions of h which intersect, and between them is where ∆𝑠𝑝 dips below zero. Figures 
3.5 and 3.6 visualize two examples of these functions in 3D plots with values for Q set to 
1/2 and 1/4, respectively. 
 
Figure 3.5. Two perspectives of a 3D plot of ∆𝒔𝒑, R, and h, (in colour) when Q = 1/2, 








Figure 3.6. Two perspectives of a 3D plot of ∆𝒔𝒑, R, and h, (in colour) when Q = 1/4, 
S = 0, V = 1 and C = 2. A secondary plane (black) at ∆𝒔𝒑 = 0 has been added for 
illustrative purposes. 
The secondary (right-hand side) perspectives of each example plot show the functions h = 
(1 – Q) and h = −(𝑅 − 1)/2(𝑅 + 1) as borders through which ∆𝑠𝑝 crosses as it dips 
below zero. Based on the expressions found for h in the additive indirect component and 
the example figures shown, when C and V are positive values, ∆𝑠𝑝 is only positive when 
h is less than both (1 – Q) and −(𝑅 − 1)/2(𝑅 + 1) or when h is greater than both (1 – Q) 
and −(𝑅 − 1)/2(𝑅 + 1). As with the additive direct component, if h is only greater (or 
conversely, less than) one of these two functions, ∆𝑠𝑝 will be negative. 
These results, in conjunction with the results from the synergy component, indicate that 
there is a potential cost to B strategists disproportionately favoring other B strategists as 
their partners as opposed to H/D mixed strategists. However, when the frequency of B 
strategists is high in the population and homogeneous A1 pairs occur by virtue of this 





my model, this means that when R is low but S is high (which can occur when there is 
random or disassortative pairing but high A1 frequency) the requirements for mutants to 
outcompete WT individuals are less restrictive than for WT individuals to outcompete 
mutants. 
Clearly, relatedness, synergy, and role-based expression each significantly influence the 
selection of social behaviours, even when the behaviour is non-cooperative like conflict 
over territory ownership.  
3.2 Altruism 
Price’s equation has classically been used as a means of exploring different ways to 
model altruistic behaviour (Grafen 2006; Queller 1992; Frank 1995), and due to the 
complications of inclusive fitness, the utility of my heterogeneous pair composition 
variable Q may be best illustrated with this example.  
Previous literature has emphasized the importance of altruistic behaviour being expressed 
conditionally (e.g., Charlesworth 1978; Parker 1989). Queller (2000) has particularly 
emphasized this in the context of sterile castes in eusocial insect species, where altruists 
forgo any personal fitness in order to convey a fitness benefit (in the form of brood care, 
for example) to a reproducing relative. Recognition systems, which often coevolve with 
altruistic behaviour (Axelrod et al. 2004), allow individuals to discriminate between kin 
and non-kin, and can be vital in the evolution of conditionally expressed altruistic 
behaviours with significant fitness costs.  
To explore the importance of kin recognition systems with my model, I consider the same 
haploid, asexual population of organisms as described in the Model Foundation section, 
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with individuals in the population again carrying one of two alleles, the wild-type allele 
A0 or the mutant A1. As in the previous example, individuals in the population occupy 
asymmetric roles, P1 and P2, and exhibit pairwise interactions resulting in individual 
fitness outcomes v1zz’ and v2zz’. Each interactant in a pair may employ one of two 
strategies: 
A or altruist: invests energy in helping partners, reducing its own reproduction as 
a result, incurring fitness cost c on the FI but conferring fitness benefit b to its 
social partner. 
E or egoist: reproduces as usual. 
In this example, carriers of the wild-type allele A0 always employ strategy E, whereas 
carriers of the mutant allele A1 employ one of either strategy depending on their role (P1 
or P2) and their social partner’s genotype. I will assume, for now, that individuals in this 
population possess perfect kin recognition systems. In other words, A1 carriers recognize 
their social partner’s genotype with perfect accuracy. In this model, individuals in the P1 
role will be considered to establish a social environment for individuals in the P2 role to 
react to. In nature, this would be analogous to, for example, P1 locating a habitat first and 
P2 reacting by either moving on to a new habitat area (egoist) or staying to help P1 care 
for its offspring, forgoing its own reproduction as a result (altruist). By virtue of the 
above allele descriptions, A0 carriers will not vary in their strategy choice, regardless of 
role. By contrast, individuals carrying A1 will only employ strategy A when in the P2 role 
and – with the assumption of perfect kin recognition – their social partner is also an A1 
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carrier. The fitness outcomes of each type of interaction according to the above 
description are laid out in Table 3.2.  
Table 3.2. Average fitness outcomes to individuals carrying either allele A0 or A1, 
where A1 carriers employ strategy A conditionally on their own role and the 
genotype of their social partner. In this example, individuals exhibit perfect kin 
recognition. 
Pair type = zz’ Fitness to P1 = v1 Fitness to P2 = v2 
11 b -c 
10 0 0 
01 0 0 
00 0 0 
Substituting these values into the DObszz’ expressions in Equation 10 produces 𝛽𝐹𝐼 and 
𝛽𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡 coefficients that are identical:  
∆𝑠𝑝 ∝
𝑅𝑆(𝑏 –  𝑐)
2𝑅 +  2
+
𝑆(𝑏 –  𝑐)






where 𝛽𝐹𝐼 = 𝛽𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡 =
𝑆(𝑏 – 𝑐)
2𝑅 + 2
. This result is expected: when A1 carriers express strategy A 
exclusively towards other A1 carriers, and never towards A0 carriers, fitness effects 
condense to be solely dependent on the size of b and c, and the likelihood that interacting 
pairs share the same allele (measured via R and S).  
To vary the accuracy of recognition between A1 carriers in this example, I modify the 
fitness outcomes in Table 3.2 such that with frequency e, A1 reactors (i.e., those in P2 
role) will make an error in the recognition of their social partner and behave accordingly. 
When such an error occurs in an A1 – A1 pairing for example, P2 would erroneously 
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recognize its partner as an A0 carrier, and employ strategy E instead of A. Table 3.3 
outlines these modified fitness outcomes.  
Table 3.3. Average fitness outcomes to individuals carrying either allele A0 or A1. 
With frequency (1 – e), A1 carriers in the P2 role employ strategy A conditionally on 
the genotype of their social partner; with frequency e, A1 carriers make an error in 
recognizing their partner, and behave according to said error. In this example, A1 
carriers in the P1 role are unable to make an error, as they are not reacting to the 
genotype of their partner, and instead setting the phenotypic environment for P2 
individuals to react to. 
Pair type = zz’ Fitness to P1 = v1 Fitness to P2 = v2 
11 (1 – e)b (1 – e)(-c) 
10 0 0 
01 eb e(-c) 
00 0 0 
When these outcomes are substituted into the DObszz’ expressions in Equation 10, we find
6 
∆𝑠𝑝 ∝ 𝑅𝑄𝑏𝑒 − 𝑄(𝑐𝑒) + 𝑆 [
(1 − 𝑒)(𝑏 − 𝑐)
2
− 𝑄𝑒(𝑏 − 𝑐)]. 
(13) 
As with the Hawk/Dove/Bourgeois example, the three components of Equation 13 
correspond to the additive indirect, additive direct, and nonadditive fitness effect 
components described in Section 2.5 for Equation 10. Applying the same hypothetical 
 
6
 Equation 13 simplifies immediately to the formula shown here due to several factors of zero being 
removed. The fully expanded form of this equation is  
∆𝑠𝑝 ∝ 𝑅[𝑄𝑏𝑒 + (1 − 𝑄)0 − 0] + [𝑄(−𝑐𝑒) + (1 − 𝑄)0 − 0]
+ 𝑆 [(
(1 − 𝑒)(𝑏 − 𝑐)
2
− 𝑄(−𝑐𝑒) + (1 − 𝑄)0) − (𝑄𝑏𝑒 + (1 − 𝑄)0 − 0)]. 
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scenario as before, we may think of each component based on the idea of interactants 
‘switching’ their alleles. For the additive direct component, (𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠10 – 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠00), a wild 
type (WT) focal individual is making a unilateral ‘decision’ to switch from its original 
allele A0 to the mutant allele A1. In doing so, this individual moves from experiencing 
zero fitness effects due to its own behaviour (a reminder that this does not mean the FI 
experiences zero fitness, simply that its base fitness has not been influenced), to 
potentially experiencing an additive fitness effect due to its behaviour, depending on its 
role and the likelihood of error, e. When in the P1 role with probability (1 – Q), the 
mutant is establishing the social environment (arriving in a new territory first, for 
example) and thus is not in a position to ‘react’ to an already established social 
environment and potentially make an error in doing so. In contrast, when the mutant is in 
the P2 role with probability Q, it is in a position to react to the social environment 
established by its social partner, P1. If the FI recognizes its social partner to be a WT 
individual and behaves accordingly, it will adopt strategy E. If, however, an ‘error’ 
occurs, the FI will instead adopt strategy A, thereby experiencing a fitness cost – c. This 
‘error’ can manifest in a number of ways, including problems with the FI’s ability to 
recognize kin, epigenetic effects involving penetrance of the allele involved, or even 
cultural effects. The entire additive effect component, when taking the ‘final’ (𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠10 ) 
minus ‘initial’ (𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠00) additive effects due to the FI switching from the WT to mutant 
allele, produces −𝑄𝑐𝑒. 
For the indirect additive effect 𝑅(𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠01 – 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠00), we may imagine the FI’s partner 
switching from A0 to A1, thereby switching from both individuals experiencing zero 
fitness effects to the mutant potentially conferring a fitness benefit b to the FI depending 
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on its role and on the frequency of error e. Again, the mutant is only in a position to make 
an error when in the P2 role, which occurs with probability Q. When in the P2 role, the 
mutant will recognize its social partner’s genotype with probability (1 – e) and adopt 
strategy E accordingly. When an error occurs with probability e, the mutant will instead 
adopt strategy A and confer a fitness benefit b to the WT individual. When this effect is 
multiplied by R, we reorient the perspective such that the individual switching from WT 
to mutant is now the FI. The indirect effect to this FI caused by its switch in alleles is 
measured as the fitness effect that the FI causes to its partner weighted by the extent to 
which the interactants are related, or Qbe. 
Moving on to the nonadditive component, 𝑆((𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠11 – 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠10) − (𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠01 – 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠00)), 
the last three fitness terms have again already been described above (𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠10 =
−𝑄𝑐𝑒, 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠01 = 𝑄𝑏𝑒, 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠00 = 0) leaving only 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠11 to describe. This effect 
encompasses the outcome to a mutant FI in a homogeneous pairing. When the FI is in the 
P2 role, it may recognize the genotype of its mutant partner and adopt strategy A 
accordingly with probability (1 – e), conferring a fitness benefit b to its partner and 
experiencing a fitness cost c due to its behaviour. When an error occurs with probability 
e, the FI in role P2 does not confer this benefit to its partner and does not experience a 
cost from its behaviour. Because the FI in a homogeneous A1 pairing has an equal 
likelihood of being in either role P1 or P2, the effects to each individual in such an 




Using Equation 12 as a baseline, Equation 13 can be analyzed in a manner similar to the 
analysis of the HDB game in the previous section (3.1). Without errors, the sign of ∆𝑠𝑝 in 
the altruism model depends only on three variables: S, b and c. This indicates that the 
degree to which interactants are more related to each other than what is expected by 
random chance, or R, does not influence the frequency of A1 when altruism is expressed 
conditionally on role and the partner’s genotype, without any errors. This makes sense 
because if mutants only confer benefits exclusively towards other mutants, and only 
when the other mutant (the partner) is behaving as an egoist, then the proportion of 
mutants in homogeneous pairs is the only factor influencing the size of ∆𝑠𝑝. Whether the 
rate of mutant homogeneous pairs is greater than or less than what is expected by chance 
doesn’t matter: assuming b > c, so long as S is greater than zero, ∆𝑠𝑝 will be positive. 
When S is zero, obviously ∆𝑠𝑝 is also zero, as A1 carriers are never paired with other 
carriers and thus the fitness effects of this allele are no different than those of A0.  
Relaxing the assumption of no errors, the variables Q and R reappear in the model. If 
there is again a simplifying assumption of a rare mutant allele and random mixing, the 
frequency of homogeneous A1 pairings approaches zero (and therefore R = S = 0) leaving 
only the additive direct cost −𝑄𝑐𝑒. As the mutant allele becomes more frequent, S will 
begin to rise accordingly. R, however, may not necessarily rise with an increase in A1 
allele frequency: depending on whether individuals pair randomly, assortatively (‘like 
with like’) or disassortatively, R may be zero, positive, or negative. For now, I assume 




− 𝑄𝑒(𝑏 − 𝑐)], with error rates above zero now considered. This component 
is fairly straightforward, with a form similar to that shown in Equation 12. With errors 
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incorporated, the expression 𝑆(𝑏 − 𝑐)/2 is now partitioned into the fitness effects 
resulting from an interaction without errors, which occurs with frequency (1 – e), minus 
those same fitness effects multiplied by the rate of error, e. In essence, this component is 
measuring the difference between the average fitness effects experienced by an individual 
in a homogeneous A1 pairing and the average fitness effects experienced by an individual 
in a heterogeneous pairing. The importance of kin recognition, conditional expression, 
and role in my model is clear in this nonadditive component, as whether it contributes 
positively or negatively to ∆𝑠𝑝 depends on the rate of non-error, (1 – e), in proportion to 
the rate of error, e, and the probability of a mutant being in the P2 role, Q. So long as the 
rate of non-error is more than double the likelihood of an error occurring multiplied by 
the likelihood that mutants are in the P2 role (because errors are only possible when P2 is 
a mutant), or (1 – e) > 2eQ, ∆𝑠𝑝 will be positive. This relationship between e and Q is 
illustrated in Figure 3.7: as Q increases, the maximum level of e allowable for ∆𝑠𝑝 to be 
positive decreases. At Q = 0.5 (meaning mutants are in the P2 role 50% of the time), the 




Figure 3.7. Two perspectives of a 3D plot of the nonadditive component of ∆𝒔𝒑 
(𝑺[(𝟏 − 𝒆)(𝒃 − 𝒄)/𝟐 − 𝑸𝒆(𝒃 − 𝒄)]) in relation to Q and e (in colour), with S and (b – 
c) held constant (b = 2, c = 1). A secondary plane (black) at ∆𝒔𝒑 = 0 has been added 
for illustrative purposes. 
Finally relaxing the assumption of random pairing, the additive indirect component RQbe 
begins to come into play. This component’s contribution to ∆𝑠𝑝 is relatively 
straightforward: when R is positive, the expression RQbe contributes positively to ∆𝑠𝑝 
proportionately to Qe, because Q and e must be above or equal to zero, and when R is 
negative the expression contributes negatively to ∆𝑠𝑝. It seems perplexing, at first, that 
the additive indirect component includes both Q and e in its expression; Q implies a 
unilateral ‘switch’ to mutant, and e implies that an error is made in the strategy chosen (A 
or E). It is important to remember, however, that indirect additive effects are measured 







My original goal for this thesis was to explore the evolution of conditionally expressed 
social behaviours using mathematical modelling techniques. More specifically, I aimed to 
study how selection acts on genes for social behaviours that are conditionally expressed 
based on an environmental trigger, particularly when carriers of said genes 
disproportionately experience the trigger more or less often than non-carriers. To answer 
this question, I developed a mathematical model following the methods of Gardner et al. 
(2011) and those described therein. Beginning with the covariance form of Price’s 
formula, which describes a population’s change in allele frequency over a single 
generation, I developed my model in an inclusive fitness framework such that individuals 
occupy one of two roles (the conditional ‘trigger’) when interacting with a social partner. 
I then used the mathematics software Maple (2020) to streamline the process of 
rearranging my model into a form that can be more easily interpreted verbally, with 
particular emphasis on the inclusive fitness variables R and S, as well as my newly 
described variable, Q. This new variable, Q, was added to describe biases in whether 
carriers of a focal allele are disproportionately found in one role over another. To 
illustrate the utility of this new variable, I applied my model to two social behaviour 
scenarios. The first is a modified form of Maynard Smith’s Hawk/Dove/Bourgeois game 
in which the pure strategies ‘Hawk’ and ‘Dove’ are combined to create a mixed wild-type 
strategy, such that individuals behave as ‘Hawk’ or ‘Dove’ depending on a set frequency 
h, and the ‘Bourgeois’ strategy is considered mutant. The second model, of my own 
design, features an altruism scenario, where mutant strategists behave as altruists 
conditionally depending on what role they occupy and the genotype of their social 
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partner (i.e., whether they are kin or non-kin), with wild-type individuals acting as non-
altruists. To explore possibilities in which errors may occur in an individual’s ability to 
recognize kin, or its ability to express the behaviour, among other errors, I introduced an 
additional variable e, representing the frequency of such errors. I interpreted the 
components of the resulting formulae using Maple (2020) to create three-dimensional 
figures describing some of the results of these two scenarios. 
In the following sections, I will provide an overview of the results described for both 
models and their significance in the greater context of sociobiology and evolutionary 
genetics. I will also describe the limitations of this study and how it may be developed 
further to increase our understanding of inclusive fitness and evolutionary theory. 
4.1 Results overview 
In both the Hawk/Dove/Bourgeois and altruism models, the extent to which mutants 
occupied one role more than the other dramatically influenced the resulting change in 
mutant allele frequency. A clear visual representation of this influence can be seen by 
comparing figures 3.5 and 3.6 from the HDB model, where the value of Q, the frequency 
of mutants that are territory invaders, can even affect whether relatedness between 
interactants positively or negatively contributes to the survival of the mutant allele in the 
next generation. In the altruism model, lower values of Q (particularly when Q < 0.5) 
allow for greater flexibility in the frequency of errors, e, in conditionally expressed 
altruism. These results imply that models which do not include roles, or asymmetries in 
stimuli that trigger the conditional expression of social behaviours, may yield 
significantly different results if these details were included. Indeed, when we consider the 
HDB model without relatedness or synergy effects, as it was originally described by 
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Maynard Smith, Q still holds influence over the change in allele frequency regardless of 
whether mutants are more frequently paired with H or D strategists (see figures 3.3 and 
3.4). 
4.2 The significance of role and the variable Q 
When discussing inclusive fitness, particularly in the context of altruistic behaviours, 
there is a generally accepted assumption of – as described by Parker (1989) 
“conditionality of gene action”. In other words, genes associated with a behaviour, such 
as altruism in eusocial insects, cannot be unconditionally expressed such that all carriers 
always behave altruistically. If this were the case, members of sterile castes in eusocial 
colonies would not have a reproducing relative to receive their help and indirectly pass 
their genes on to the next generation, effectively leading to the colony’s extinction. While 
the assumption of conditional expression is important, I have found very few inclusive 
fitness papers that explicitly model mechanisms for this conditional action of genes for 
social behaviour. Parker’s (1989) method of doing so, which I have partially adopted for 
my model, involves creating an asymmetry between two interacting individuals such that 
one occupies role P1 and the other P2 (labeled ‘X’ and ‘Y’ in Parker’s model). These 
roles, as explained in Section 1.4 of this thesis, may represent any asymmetry between 
the two interacting individuals, such as birth order/age, territory establishment 
(owner/invader), size, and social status.  
One clear example of such an asymmetry in nature, where phenotypic expression is 
influenced by which ‘role’ an organism occupies, can be observed in the European 
honeybee Apis mellifera. Females in this eusocial species have two main castes, queens 
and workers, which are reared from larvae by nurse workers in the hive (males, or drones, 
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are also reared in this way). The specific diet fed to each female larva, as opposed to a 
larva’s genotype, is the main contributor to caste differentiation (Evans and Wheeler 
1999). The molecular mechanisms behind this process are still being studied, but thus far 
it is clear that both the type of food given to larvae (with queens-to-be fed primarily a 
substance called ‘royal jelly’, and workers fed a mixture of royal jelly and nectar) and the 
amount that each larva is fed play major parts in whether an individual will develop into a 
queen or worker bee (Slater et al. 2020). If these differential diets are thought of as binary 
environmental stimuli that influence the phenotypic expression of a specific gene (or 
group of genes) in European honeybees, it is easy to see how ‘role’ (in this case, if a larva 
is fed a queen diet vs a worker diet) might be an important aspect to the evolution of 
conditional phenotypes. 
Examples of asymmetric roles in nature aren’t limited to diet alone, of course. Parker 
(1989) described other mechanisms such as age, relative physical strength, and social 
dominance/subordination. In his models, Parker also explored potential genetic 
mechanisms involved: for example, it may be that one locus determines an individual’s 
behaviour when in role X, and another locus determines behaviour when the individual 
occupies role Y. An aspect of asymmetric roles which Parker fails to consider, and which 
is yet to be explored in modelling literature, is the potential for bias in the genotypes 
found in each role. If, for example, there was a rare allele in honeybees which increases 
the chances of carriers being chosen as new queens by nurse bees, how might that affect 
the evolution of these eusocial behaviours? 
Interestingly enough, evidence has already been found of genetic predispositions to castes 
in some eusocial species. Volny and Gordon (2002), for example, describe differences in 
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genotype at a particular microsatellite locus between reproductive and non-reproductive 
members of the red harvester ant Pogonomyrmex barbatus. This is possible because, 
according to Volny and Gordon, non-reproductives inherit heterozygous genotypes and 
reproductives inherit homozygous genotypes at the focal locus, which allows both alleles 
found in workers to be carried by homozygous queens and drones. Genetic 
predispositions influencing caste determination have been observed in other eusocial 
insect species as well, such as members of the stingless bee genus Melipona (Hartfelder 
et al. 2006). Despite this, the potential effect of genotype on caste differentiation seems 
generally to be overlooked in the literature. Schwander et al. (2010) discussed this in 
further depth, arguing that there is an assumption commonly made that evidence for 
environmental influences on caste differentiation suggests that the environment is the 
main or only factor involved. In fact, according to Schwander et al, there is growing 
evidence that caste differentiation is caused by a combination of both environmental and 
genetic factors in several eusocial species.  
To integrate concepts of genetic inheritance and developmental biology (environmental 
influence) into a modern evolutionary synthesis is a huge undertaking. Weitekamp et al. 
(2017) discuss some of the complexities of considering environment-gene interactions in 
empirical studies, such as a significantly higher number of variables that must be 
controlled for. Mary Jane West-Eberhard has been a strong advocate for the integration of 
environmental effects into evolutionary theory. In much of her work (1987, 1989, 2005), 
she argues that current research puts too little emphasis on the contribution of 
development and the environment to the evolutionary change of organisms, resulting in a 
gap in our understanding of the evolution of complex traits such as eusocial behaviours. 
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The use of mathematical modelling techniques – such as those used in this thesis – may 
help to bridge this gap, and possibly provide valuable insight in situations where it is 
impossible to control all variables necessary for informative results. 
4.3 Limitations and future development 
When I first began the development of my model, I decided to use the Price formula for a 
number of reasons, including its common usage in the inclusive fitness theory literature 
and the ease with which the model can be converted into Hamilton’s Rule. I was also 
aware of the limitations of Price’s equation, which can be summarized as follows.  
Most likely the greatest criticism of Price’s formula is its lack of dynamic sufficiency; in 
other words, the model cannot be iterated over and over to explore the evolution of a trait 
though several generations. The source of this limitation stems from the use of pair 
frequencies, such as F2 (the frequency of A1 – A1 pairings). Because these frequencies are 
assumed to be unknown (so that it’s possible to explore different pair frequency effects), 
we do not know the composition of different pairs in the daughter generation, and thus 
cannot calculate the fitness effects of their interactions. If needed, dynamic sufficiency 
can be forced into the model by creating a calculation ‘rule’ for social pair distributions. 
For example, if a rule is created such that the frequency of each pair type is always 
proportional to the population allele frequencies (thus F2 = p
2), both the HDB and 
altruism models can be made to be dynamically sufficient. The results from such a 
modification, however, provide little novel information, and thus I have not provided 
them in this thesis. 
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Another limitation is the exponential increase in complexity when attempting to model 
multiple alleles and/or more than two interactants with the Price equation. To model more 
than two alternative alleles for example, or to model diploid organisms, fitness effects 
must be created for each possible combination of alleles (assuming nonadditive effects – 
less so if the effects are additive). Since role is emphasized here as well, we would also 
need to consider how the fitness effects of different allele combinations may vary 
depending on which carriers are in which roles. To model more than two interactants, 
new model parameters would need to be designed to consider how many interactants 
exist in each role per interaction, and how the various allele combinations may influence 
the fitness effects resulting from these interactions. While these added details can 
absolutely be explored using the concepts introduced in my thesis, I aimed to make clear 
the importance of conditional expression with my model, and so avoided adding too 
many details for simplicity’s sake.  
4.4 Conclusion 
Inclusive fitness models in sociobiology commonly emphasize the importance of 
relatedness, R, and synergy, S. In this thesis I propose a third key variable for inclusive 
fitness models, Q, which describes the commonly overlooked potential bias in the genetic 
composition of individuals exposed to an environmental stimulus – here referred to as 
‘role’. I describe an inclusive fitness model built from Price’s formula which can be 
converted into Hamilton’s rule, and provide results from two example applications of the 
model – one in which I consider the classic Hawk/Dove/Bourgeois game originally 
described by Maynard Smith, and another where I consider fitness outcomes of altruistic 
behaviour prone to errors in kin recognition. Both the Hawk-Dove-Bourgeois and 
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altruism applications of my model show dramatically different results when Q is 
considered (i.e., when biases in allele frequency for each role are allowed) versus when 
the models only focus on R and S. Based on these results, it is possible that inclusive 
fitness models which do not consider biases in role composition may be missing key 
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Appendix A: Supplementary Equations 
𝛽𝐹𝐼
=
2𝑝2(𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠10  −  𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠00) +  𝑝(𝐹2(𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠11 − 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠10 − 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠01 + 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠00) − 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠10 + 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠00) − 𝐹2(𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠11 − 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠01)





2𝑝2(𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠01  −  𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠00) +  𝑝(𝐹2(𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠11 − 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠10 − 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠01 + 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠00) − 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠01 + 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠00) − 𝐹2(𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠11 − 𝐷𝑂𝑏𝑠10)
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